Kuomintang - Wikipedia
The Historyof Conflict Between the KMT and the CCP. Sununary. 34 The KMTand the CCP During the War faith in me and for his tremendous assistance in this project. . If I am double-minded, may God examine and judge me! 6. all Chinese history is written by its latest winners, the Chinese Communist Party. The KMT was a dictatorial regime that had risen to power partly to as “ peanut”, and Britain's chief of staff, Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. The KMT was after all a Leninist like party and the Soviets wanted to support them to Thus Stalin reversed his earlier good relations with CKS to favour the CCP . the USSR, did people know the difference between God and Joseph Stalin?.
This laid the beginning of his lifelong antagonism against communism. Chiang was also particularly committed to Sun's idea of "political tutelage.
Using this ideology, Chiang built himself into the dictator of the Republic of China, both in the Chinese mainland and when the national government was relocated to Taiwan. Chiang had to defeat three separate warlords and two independent armies. Chiang, with Soviet supplies, conquered the southern half of China in nine months.
Having taken Nanking in March, Chiang halted his campaign and prepared a violent break with Wang and his communist allies. Wang finally surrendered his power to Chiang. The city was the internationally recognized capital, though previously controlled by warlords. This event allowed the KMT to receive widespread diplomatic recognition in the same year. The capital was moved from Peking to Nanking, the original capital of the Ming Dynastyand thus a symbolic purge of the final Qing elements.
This period of KMT rule in China between and was relatively stable and prosperous and is still known as the Nanjing decade. After the Northern Expedition inthe Nationalist government under the KMT declared that China had been exploited for decades under unequal treaties signed between the foreign powers and the Qing Dynasty.
The KMT government demanded that the foreign powers renegotiate the treaties on equal terms. However, the KMT under Chiang's leadership aimed at establishing a centralized one-party state with one ideology.
This was even more evident following Sun's elevation into a cult figure after his death.
The control by one single party began the period of "political tutelage," whereby the party was to lead the government while instructing the people on how to participate in a democratic system. The topic of reorganizing the army, brought up at a military conference insparked the Central Plains War. The cliques, some of them former warlords, demanded to retain their army and political power within their own territories.
Although Chiang finally won the war, the conflicts among the cliques would have a devastating effect on the survival of the KMT.
Although the Second Sino-Japanese War officially broke out inJapanese aggression started in when they staged the Mukden Incident and occupied Manchuria. Chiang was alarmed by the expansion of the communist influence. He believed that in order to fight against foreign aggression, the KMT must solve its internal conflicts first, so he started his second attempt to exterminate CPC members in With the advice from German military advisors, the KMT forced the Communists to withdraw from their bases in southern and central China into the mountains in a massive military retreat known as the Long March.
The KMT was also known to have used terror tactics against suspected communists, through the utilization of a secret police force, who were employed to maintain surveillance on suspected communists and political opponents.
Fitzgerald describes China under the rule of the KMT thus: However, in many situations the alliance was in name only; after a brief period of cooperation, the armies began to fight the Japanese separately, rather than as coordinated allies. While the KMT army received heavy casualties fighting the Japanese, the CPC expanded its territory by guerrilla tactics within Japanese occupied regions, leading some[ who?
The Soviet Union declared war on Japan just before they surrendered and occupied Manchuriathe north eastern part of China. First, the KMT reduced troop levels precipitously after the Japanese surrender, leaving large numbers of able-bodied, trained fighting men who became unemployed and disgruntled with the KMT as prime recruits for PLA.
Second, the KMT government proved thoroughly unable to manage the economy, allowing hyperinflation to result. Among the most despised and ineffective efforts it undertook to contain inflation was the conversion to the gold standard for the national treasury and the Gold Standard Scrip in Augustoutlawing private ownership of gold, silver and foreign exchange, collecting all such precious metals and foreign exchange from the people and issuing the Gold Standard Scrip in exchange.
As most farmland in the north were under CPC's control, the cities governed by the KMT lacked food supply and this added to the hyperinflation. The new scrip became worthless in only ten months and greatly reinforced the nationwide perception of the KMT as a corrupt or at best inept entity. Third, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his forces to defend the urbanized cities. This decision gave CPC a chance to move freely through the countryside.
However, with the country suffering from hyperinflationwidespread corruption and other economic ills, the KMT continued to lose popular support. Some leading officials and military leaders of the KMT hoarded material, armament and military-aid funding provided by the US. Yan was successful in creating a complex of heavy industries around Taiyuan, but neglected to publicize the extent of his success outside of Shanxi, probably to deceive Chiang Kai-shek.
Despite his measured successes in modernizing the industry of Shanxi, Yan repeatedly petitioned the central government for financial assistance in order to extend the local railroad, and for other reasons, but his requests were usually denied.
When Yan refused to send taxes collected from the trade of salt produced in Shanxi's public factories to the central government, Chiang retaliated by flooding the market of northern China with so much salt produced around coastal China that the price of salt in China's northern provinces dropped extremely low: In Chiang's announcement of a "five-year plan" to modernize Chinese industry was perhaps inspired by the successes of the "Ten-Year Plan" that Yan had announced several years before.
Although embracing the traditional values of the landed gentry, he denounced their "oppression" of the peasantry and took steps to initiate land reform and weaken the power of landowners over the populace in the countryside.Alternate History: What If China Became Nationalist?
These reforms also weakened potential rivals in his province, in addition to benefiting Shanxi farmers. He developed an all-encompassing, idiosyncratic ideology literally "Yan Xishan Thought" and disseminated it by sponsoring a network of village newspapers and traveling dramatic troupes. He devised a system of public educationproducing a population of trained workers and farmers literate enough to be indoctrinated without difficulty.
The early date by which Yan devised and implemented these reforms during the Warlord Era contradicts later claims that these reforms were modeled on Communist programs and not vice versa. Germany's defeat in World War I and Yan's defeat in Henan in caused him to reassess the value of militarism as a way of life.
He then decreased the size of the army until in order to save moneyuntil a rumor circulated that rival warlords were planning on invading Shanxi. Yan then introduced military reforms designed to train a rural militia ofmen, along the lines of Japanese and American reserves. His troops were perhaps the only army in the Warlord era drawn exclusively from the province in which they were stationed, and because he insisted that his soldiers perform work to improve Shanxi's infrastructure—including road-maintenance and assisting farmers—and because his discipline ensured that his soldiers actually paid for anything they took from civilians, the army in Shanxi enjoyed much more popular support than most of his rivals' armies in China.
Despite efforts to subject his officers to a rigorous, Japanese-style training regimen and to indoctrinate them in Yan Xishan Thought, his armies never proved to be especially well-trained or disciplined in battle. In general, Yan's military record is not considered positive—he had more defeats than victories—and it is unclear whether his officer corps either understood or sympathized with his objectives, instead entering his service solely in the interests of achieving prestige and a higher standard of living.
Yan built an arsenal in Taiyuan that, for the entire period of his administration, remained the only center in China capable of producing field artillery. The presence of this arsenal was one of the main reasons that Yan was able to maintain Shanxi's relative independence.
Attempts at social reform[ edit ] Yan went to great lengths to eradicate social traditions which he considered antiquated. He insisted that all men in Shanxi abandon their Qing-era queues, giving police instructions to clip off the queues of anyone still wearing them. In one instance, Yan lured people into theatres in order to have his police systematically cut the hair of the audience.
After Kuomintang military victories in generated great interest in Shanxi for the Nationalist ideology, including women's rightsYan allowed girls to enroll in middle school and college, where they promptly formed a women's association.
He discouraged the use of the traditional lunar calendar and encouraged the development of local boy scout organizations. Like the Communists who later succeeded Yan, he punished habitual lawbreakers to "redemption through labour" in state-run factories. At first, he dealt with opium dealers and addicts severely, throwing addicts in prison and exposing them and their families to public humiliation.
Many convicted of opium-related offenses then died of sudden withdrawal from the drug. Afterpartly due to public opposition to harsh punishment, Yan abandoned punishing addicts in favor of attempting to rehabilitate them, pressuring individuals through their families, and constructing sanitariums designed to slowly cure addicts of their addictions.
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In the absence of efforts by other warlords to combat opium production and trade, Yan's efforts to combat opium use only increased the price of opium so much that narcotics of all kinds were drawn into Shanxi from other provinces.
Users often switched from opium to pills mixed from morphine and heroinwhich were easier to smuggle and use. Because the most influential and powerful gentry in Shanxi were often the worst offenders, officials drawn from the privileged class of Shanxi seldom enforced Yan's decrees outlawing the use of narcotics, and often evaded punishment themselves.
Eventually Yan was forced to abandon his efforts to suppress opium trafficking, and attempted instead to establish a government monopoly on the production and sale of opium in Shanxi. The traffic persisted, but Yan's interests in opposing it were perhaps limited by a fear of provoking the Japanese, who manufactured most of the morphine and heroin available in China inside their concession area in Tianjinand who came to control much of the drug trade in northern China in the s.
Though gains were made to improve the economy of Shanxi, his efforts were limited by the fact that he himself had little formal training in economic or industrial theory. He also suffered from a lack of experienced, trained advisers capable of directing even moderately complicated tasks related to economic development.
Because most of the educated staff that he did have access to were solidly entrenched within the landed gentry of Shanxi, it is possible that many of his officials may have deliberately sabotaged his efforts for reform, preferring that the peasants working their fields continue their cheap, traditional labour. Throughout the rest of Yan's life he identified with the position of most Chinese conservatives at the time: Influence of Confucianism[ edit ] Yan was emotionally attached to Confucianism by virtue of his upbringing, and because he identified its values as a historically effective solution to the chaos and disorder of his time.
He justified his rule via Confucian political theories and attempted to revive Confucian virtues as being universally accepted. In his speeches and writing Yan developed an extravagant admiration for the virtues of moderation and harmony associated with the Confucian Doctrine of the Mean.
Many of the reforms that Yan attempted were undertaken with the intention of demonstrating that he was a junzi, the epitome of Confucian virtue. He taught that everyone had a capacity for innate goodness, but that in order to fulfill this capacity people had to subordinate their emotions and desires to the control of their conscience.
He admired the Ming dynasty philosophers Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangmingwho disparaged knowledge and urged men to act on the basis of their intuition. Because Yan believed that human beings could only achieve their potentials through intense self-criticism and self-cultivation, he established in every town a Heart-Washing Society, whose members gathered each Sunday to meditate and listen to sermons based on the themes of the Confucian classics.
Everyone at these meetings was supposed to rise and confess aloud his misdeeds of the past week, inviting criticism from the other members. He appreciated the efforts of missionaries mostly Americans who maintained a complex of schools in Taigu to educate and modernize Shanxi.
He regularly addressed the graduating classes of these schools, but was generally unsuccessful in recruiting these students to serve his regime. Yan supported the indigenous Christian church in Taiyuan, and at one time seriously considered using Christian chaplains in his army. His public support of Christianity waned afterwhen he failed to come to the defense of Christians during anti-foreigner and anti-Christian demonstrations that polarized Taiyuan.
He urged his subjects to place their faith in a supreme being that he called "Shangdi": Like Christianity, Yan Xishan Thought was permeated with the belief that, through accepting his ideology, people could become regenerated or reborn. He stated that the primary goal of the Heart-Washing Society was to encourage Chinese patriotism by reviving the Confucian church, leading foreigners to accuse him of attempting to create a Chinese version of Shinto.
Yan altered some of Sun's doctrines before disseminating them in Shanxi, formulating his own version of Sun's Three Principles of the People that replaced the principles of nationalism and democracy with the principles of virtue and knowledge. During the May Fourth Movementwhen students in Taiyuan staged anti-foreign demonstrations, Yan warned that patriotism, like rainfall, was beneficial only when moderate.
During the s he attempted to set up in every village a "Good People's Movement" in order to promote the values of Chiang Kai-shek 's New Life Movement. These values included honesty, friendliness, dignity, diligence, modesty, thrift, personal neatness and obedience.
Following this interpretation, Yan attempted to change the economy of Shanxi to become more like that of the USSRinspiring a scheme of economic "distribution according to labour". When the threat of Chinese Communists became a significant threat to Yan's rule, he defended the Communists as courageous and self-sacrificing fanatics who were different from common bandits contrary to Kuomintang propaganda and whose challenge must be met by social and economic reforms that alleviated the conditions responsible for communism.
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Unlike Marx, Yan reinterpreted Communism to correct what he believed was Marxism 's chief flaw: Yan praised Marx for his analysis of the material aspects of human society, but professed to believe that there was a moral and spiritual unity of mankind that implied that a state of harmony was closer to the human ideal than conflict.
By rejecting economic determinism in favor of morality and free will, Yan hoped to create a society that would be more productive and less violent than he perceived communism to be, while avoiding the exploitation and human misery that he believed was the inevitable result of capitalism. Yan himself blamed the failure of his ideology to become popular on the faults of his officials, charging that they abused their power and failed to explain his ideas to the common people.
In general, the officials of Shanxi misappropriated funds intended to be used for propaganda, attempted to explain Yan's ideas in language too sophisticated for the common people and often behaved in a dictatorial manner that discredited Yan's ideology and failed to generate popular enthusiasm for his regime. While he was in exile in Dalian inYan became aware of Japanese plans to invade Manchuriaand feigned collaboration with the Japanese in order to pressure Chiang Kai-shek into allowing him to return to Shanxi before warning Chiang of Japan's intent.
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Japan's subsequent success in taking Manchuria in terrified Yan, who stated that a major objective of his Ten-Year Plan was to strengthen Shanxi's defense against the Japanese. In the early s he supported anti-Japanese riots, denounced the Japanese occupation of Manchuria as "barbarous" and "evil", publicly appealed to Chiang to send troops to Manchuria and arranged for his arsenal to arm partisans fighting the Japanese occupation in Manchuria.
When the Manchukuo Imperial Army armed and led by the Japanese finally invaded Chahar inYan virtually declared war on the Japanese by accepting a position as "advisor" of the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council, an organization created by the central government to organize opposition to the Japanese.
Apparently, many high-ranking Japanese in China believed that Yan and many others in the north were fundamentally pro-Japanese and would readily subordinate themselves to the Japanese in exchange for protection from Chiang Kai-shek. Yan published an open letter in September in which he accused the Japanese of desiring to conquer all of China over the next two decades. According to Japanese sources, Yan entered into negotiations with the Japanese inbut was never very enthusiastic about "autonomy" and rejected their overtures when he realized that they intended to make him their puppet.
Yan likely used these negotiations to frighten Chiang Kai-shek into using his armies to defend Shanxi, since he was afraid that Chiang was preparing to sacrifice northern China to avoid fighting the Japanese. If these were Yan's intentions they were successful, as Chiang assured Yan that he would defend Shanxi with his army in the event that it was invaded.
As Yan predicted, the Communists enjoyed massive popular support and, although they were outnumbered and ill-armed, succeeded in occupying the southern third of Shanxi in less than a month. The Communists' strategy of guerrilla warfare was extremely effective against, and demoralizing for, Yan's forces, who repeatedly fell victim to surprise attacks. The Communists in Shanxi made good use of cooperation supplied by local peasants to evade and easily locate Yan's forces.
When reinforcements sent by the central government forced the Communists to withdraw from Shanxi, the Red Army escaped by splitting into small groups that were actively supplied and hidden by local supporters. Yan himself admitted that his troops had fought poorly during the campaign. The KMT forces that remained in Shanxi expressed hostility to Yan's rule, but did not interfere with his governance.
These Japanese-aligned forces seized the city of Bailingmiao in northern Suiyuan, where the pro-Japanese Inner Mongolian Autonomous Political Council maintained its headquarters. Three months later the head of the Political Council, Prince De Demchugdongrubdeclared that he was the ruler of an independent Mongolia Mengguguoand organized an army with the aid of Japanese equipment and training.
In August Prince De's army attempted to invade eastern Suiyuan, but it was defeated by Yan's forces under the command of Fu Zuoyi. Following this defeat, Prince De planned another invasion while Japanese agents carefully sketched and photographed Suiyuan's defenses. When Fu responded that Prince De was merely a puppet of "certain quarters" and requested that he submit to the authority of the central government, Prince De's Mongolian and Manchurian armies launched another, more ambitious attack.
Prince De's 15, soldiers were armed with Japanese weapons, supported by Japanese aircraft and often led by Japanese officers Japanese soldiers fighting for Mengguguo were often executed after their capture as illegal combatants, since Mengguguo was not recognized as being part of Japan.
Yan placed his best troops and most able generals, including Zhao Chengshou and Yan's son-in-law, Wang Jingguounder the command of Fu Zuoyi. During the month of fighting that ensued, the army of Mengguguo suffered severe casualties. Fu's forces succeeded in retaking Bailingmiao on November 24 and he was considering invading Chahar before he was warned by the Japanese Kwantung Army that doing so would provoke an attack by the Imperial Japanese Army.
Prince De's forces repeatedly attempted to retake Bailingmiao, but this only provoked Fu into sending troops north, where he successfully seized the last of Prince De's bases in Suiyuan and virtually annihilated his army. After Japanese officers were found to be aiding Prince De, Yan publicly accused Japan of aiding the invaders. His victories in Suiyuan over Japanese-backed forces were praised by Chinese newspapers and magazines, other warlords and political leaders, and many students and members of the Chinese public.
He relocated his headquarters to a remote corner of the province, effectively resisting Japanese attempts to completely seize Shanxi.
During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese made no less than five attempts to negotiate peace terms with Yan and hoped that he would become a second Wang Jingweibut Yan refused and stayed on the Chinese side.
Alliance with the Communists[ edit ] After the failed attempt by the Chinese Red Army to establish bases in southern Shanxi in earlythe subsequent continued presence of Nationalist soldiers there and the Japanese attempts to take Suiyuan that summer, Yan became convinced that the Communists were lesser threats to his rule than either the Nationalists or the Japanese.
He then negotiated a secret anti-Japanese "united front" with the Communists in October and, after the Xi'an Incident two months later, successfully influenced Chiang Kai-shek to enter into a similar agreement with the Communists.